

A
LETTER

TO THE

Right Hon. WILLIAM PITT,

ON THE

PRESENT ALARMING CRISIS

OF

PUBLIC AFFAIRS.

THE SECOND EDITION.

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A LETTER,

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S I R,

HOWEVER flattery may pervert the judgment, or long possession of power may enervate and corrupt the mind, there is nevertheless, a point of misfortune and calamity, at which intoxication usually ceases. You are, I fear, advancing by rapid strides towards that state which will leave nothing for your enemies to wish, and little for your admirers to deplore. During more than twelve years, you have been entrusted with the most sacred deposit which could be committed to ministerial hands; the welfare, the greatness, and the felicity of the Sovereign and People of England. Dazzled with the hereditary lustre of your name, fascinated by the graces, or subdued by the powers of your oratory, and charmed

with the integrity or disinterestedness which accompanied your public conduct, we long applauded and ratified the choice that had selected you for so elevated a station. Through the medium of peace, and in the sunshine of prosperity, you appeared, to common eyes, something more than man. We fondly gave you credit for imaginary qualities; and supposed that the statesman who displayed such ability in a calm, would neither be deficient in energy or talents, whenever exigencies should demand greater exertion.

In this expectation we have been, however, deceived. War and danger have withdrawn the veil which concealed you, and exposed you in all the nakedness of political imperfection. In proportion to our preceding admiration, is our present disappointment; and by a natural revulsion in the human mind, you appear less from your former greatness. You are now sinking fast to the level of ordinary Ministers; and you may, perhaps, after another inglorious or disastrous campaign, wisely desire to withdraw from a situation, to which the voice of your country, and of Europe, begins to pronounce you unequal. Like your predecessor, Lord North, you may seek in oblivion a shelter

shelter from popular indignation. Like him, you have not been totally improvident, it must be confessed, during the possession of power; and whatever encomiums may be lavished by flattery, on your contempt of offices or emoluments, we do not recognize in the Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports, the austere renunciations of Roman virtue. I am, however, far from arraigning the bounty of your gracious Master, nor shall I ever pursue you to the retirement of Walmer, or to the shades of Holwood. My contest is not with the man, but with the Minister; and it is only by the retrospect of your political conduct that I desire to hold you up to the approbation, or to deliver you over to the condemnation, of your country. That retrospect may be painful to you: but the times demand the severity of truth. If the example cannot save the present age from the destruction that impends, it may yet operate as an awful lesson to future generations.

I shall not pass over in an invidious silence, the first nine years of your administration. They were, in truth, Sir, a golden period, and will long, I fear, be recollected with a sentiment of melancholy regret. The blemishes,

mishes, or mistakes of your ministry, were lost and swallowed up in the blaze of national prosperity. The contracted policy, and ungenerous duplicity, which marked your whole treatment of the Governor General of Bengal, whom you meanly sacrificed to the fury of Mr. Burke; the labyrinth of the Irish Propositions, in which you was bewildered and lost; the pertinacious adherence to the Duke of Richmond's system of fortification, which you did not abandon, except in the last extremity:—these deviations from rectitude, or errors in judgment, were speedily forgiven by a generous people, confident, and disposed to examine your actions by a partial standard.

Every circumstance seemed to combine, which could prolong the general delusion, and fill us with pleasing anticipation of your yet untried abilities, when the hour of trial and difficulty should arrive. The Court of Versailles, accustomed frequently to dictate under former princes, allowed a Prussian army, acting in concert with England, to overrun Holland, and penetrate to Amsterdam, without venturing to resist, or interfere. The recent death of Vergennes, the embarrassment of the French finances, and perhaps more than either, that

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latent spirit of democratic fermentation, which has since overturned the monarchy, and convulsed Europe, compelled Louis the Sixteenth to temporize, and even to submit. During the contest that arose three years later, with the Court of Madrid, relative to the possession of Nootka, you was fortunate enough to augment your reputation. The menaces, the preparations, and the promptitude of the British Cabinet, terrified the Spanish Ministry. They consented, at least in words, to relinquish the object in dispute : and though time has proved how fallacious were these apparent indications of fear or of inferiority, your admirers did not fail to find new matter for panegyric, in your firmness, your vigour, and your resources.

Under these promises of future capacity began the present war. That awful cloud, which collecting in the horizon of France, has burst over Europe, and threatens to sweep us from the place which we have hitherto occupied in the scale of nations, was long suspended in the political atmosphere. To the eye of the moralist and the philosopher, it formed at first a subject of pleasing admiration, or a theme of wide and curious speculation, rather than an object of terror. We beheld only its
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gilded surface, and its majestic or brilliant colouring, unconscious of the sanguinary deluge which it contained within. I am ready to admit in their utmost force, the validity and wisdom of the motives which compelled you to meet, rather than tamely to recede from the tempest. It is not with the principles that produced the present rupture, I am at variance. The rapid conquest of the Netherlands, and the projected invasion of Holland by Dumourier, left you no safe or honourable alternative except resistance. As well might Carthage, disarmed and defenceless, have expected from the Roman Senate, terms of equity and moderation, as Great Britain from the Convention of 1793. I neither charge you with basely crouching in the hour of danger, nor with pusillanimity and desertion of your post. Your guilt is of a very different description, and is much too deep to stand in any need of aggravation. If I meant to convey it in classical language, I would recommend to your perusal the story of the son of Clymené. Though fabulous, its application is not less obvious, than it is unfortunately just. Though it is neither to be found in Livy, nor in Tacitus, it is not unworthy of your attention. I disdain, however, to press the allusion

allusion further, or to borrow arms from the fables of antiquity. Let us calmly examine your conduct, and decide upon its merits.

Nothing could be more brilliant than the opening of the first campaign. We beheld the United Provinces rescued from Dumourier, by the English forces, at the moment when their ruin or subjection appeared to be inevitable. The subsequent defeats experienced by that commander, and his ultimate defection from the cause of the Republic, seemed to be only the prelude to greater and more decisive success. Advancing into the Netherlands, the allied armies retook possession of those provinces; and the victory of Famars obliterated in a great measure the unfortunate defeat at Gemappe. Condé surrendered; and Valenciennes, one of the strongest barriers of France, was reduced to capitulate. Consternation pervaded the councils of the new Republic, while the troops, intimidated or dispersed by the treachery of their general, could with difficulty be re-assembled and organized anew under Dampierre. This, Sir, was the decisive moment when the fate of England, of Europe, and of mankind, might be said to depend on

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your resolutions. It was an awful crisis, and such as we cannot expect to arrive again in the history of nations. Two great and obvious alternatives presented themselves for your choice. Either of them, embraced with vigour, and followed up with promptitude, might have extricated you from a situation beset with dangers; and terminated the war, if not gloriously, at least honourably and beneficially.

Had peace been your object, never was there a time so propitious, or at which equitable terms might have been offered and obtained with such a moral certainty of success. France had not then felt her own force; nor had the experiment, so fatal to her enemies, that of rising in a mass, been yet adopted by their despair. The revolutionary spirit, which menaces Europe with a subversion more complete than was ever effected by the Roman discipline, or by the numbers and fury of the barbarians of the North, had not attained its height. Disunion and jealousy had not weakened, nor had defeats and misfortunes broken, the courage of the combined armies. Holland and Flanders were not lost. Prussia and Spain had not seceded from the great alliance. Piedmont

mont was unattacked; and the King of Sardinia retained in his possession the most important passages of the Alps.

If the prosecution of the war appeared to you a more judicious, or a more salutary line of conduct, the occasion was not less favourable. Some of the principal outworks of the republic were carried; and the troops, elated by their recent advantages, might have penetrated with facility into the interior provinces of France. Artois and Picardy were open to invasion. Cambray could not have resisted even a single week. Bouchain was incapable of standing a long, or a regular siege. By the capture of Douay, which must have surrendered almost on the first summons, the allies would have become masters of the only French foundery for cannon on the Northern frontier. I need not point out the incalculable effects which must have followed from depriving the enemy of their superiority in artillery, to which they were eminently indebted for the victory at Gemappe, and which they have maintained in almost every subsequent engagement throughout the war. The English and Imperial cavalry might have reached the banks of the Somme, without impediment or molestation; and the

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Convention, pressed by such formidable enemies, might possibly have been driven to the most desperate extremity.

Such was the situation, and such were the prospects of the combined powers, at the moment when the Duke of York received orders from England, to form the siege of Dunkirk. Intoxicated with your short-lived triumphs, too haughty to make proposals of peace, and destitute of judgment to perceive the only means which could enable you to prosecute the war with a rational probability of success, you divided your force at the instant when its union was indispensable. The remonstrances of the Prince of Cobourg were treated with disregard; and from the recesses of Downing-street you rashly undertook to direct the operations of the field. The fatal issue of that precipitate and ill-concerted enterprise, renders it unnecessary for me to say a single word upon it. I do not desire to aggravate the load of public condemnation under which you are oppressed, and which is daily augmenting in violence. In pity to you I wish to draw a veil over the remainder of that unfortunate campaign, and the disgraceful one that followed. The ignominious evacuation
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of Toulon; the complete dereliction of the Low Countries; the conquest of Holland; the immense acquisitions made by France on the German frontier; and the series of victories which have accompanied their arms; these events, awful and momentous as they are, have yet been obliterated by others still more calamitous.

On whatever side we now direct our view, we find fresh subject for astonishment, anxiety, and consternation. Abandoned by Prussia, deserted by Spain, and driven with ignominy from Quiberon, you had still the presumption and credulity to believe that the Rhine and the Alps would form an insuperable barrier to the farther progress of our enemies. The rapid and alarming advance of the republican troops in Italy must, however, we may naturally suppose, awaken you from so delusive a security. Are you fully aware of the consequences to be dreaded and expected from the recent loss of Piedmont? Do you still confide in the tactics of Beaulieu, and the superiority of the Austrian cavalry, for checking the inroads of an army, elated by victory, and animated by enthusiasm? Or was it to the protection of the Tessino and the Po, that you trusted for the
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conservation of the Milaneze and the Mantuan? Feeble and ineffectual barriers!—Already Italy trembles to the utmost point of Calabria. The unfortunate Louis, driven from Verona by the terrors of the Venetians, may shortly solicit an asylum with his brother in Holyrood-house, from the fury of his former subjects. The King of Sardinia, after the ignominious treaty which he has just signed, only continues to hold his tributary and precarious crown at the mercy of the Executive Directory. Lombardy has neither the means nor the power of resistance. The Appenines will form no protection to the Great Duke of Tuscany, who can only hope, by the most profound submission, to retain his dominions. Rome may again be sacked by Buonaparté in 1796, as it was near three centuries ago, by the Constable of Bourbon; and Naples, fertile in revolutions, may be transferred from its present possessor, to some other family.

Even though Italy should escape this probable and impending subversion, are you so ill informed, or so infatuated, as to suppose that the Court of Vienna will continue the war, after the loss of the Milaneze? Has not Sir Morton Eden acquainted you of the offers making at this hour by France, in order to induce

induce the Imperial Court to conclude a separate peace? You cannot be ignorant that Bavaria is the substitute proffered for the Netherlands; and you are not unacquainted that the majority of the Austrian cabinet has decidedly advised the Emperor to accept of that equivalent. By what motives, or what offers, do you hope to prevent so great a secession from taking place? Is it by a new Imperial loan? You dare not, I believe, try the experiment. It may be fatal to the credit and circulation of this country. Will you have recourse to that versatile and mercenary Prince, who has already withdrawn his assistance from us at the most critical period of the war? He will exact from you a subsidy proportionate to the emergency, and he will abandon you on the first subject of discontent. Or is it the mediation of Spain that you will implore? You may have seen in the dispatches of Lord Bute, with what a malignant satisfaction the cabinet of Madrid enjoys your present embarrassment, and will profit at a proper moment of your increasing distress. The principal object of the late progress made by the Court, and of the interview with the Prince and Princess of Beyra, was to detach from our alliance the Portuguese. Perhaps,

haps, it is to Catherine the Second that you look for help. But that sagacious Princess, though she may send a detachment of her fleet into the Downs, in order to learn the tactics and the discipline of the English navy, will extend to you no military or effectual protection. Her eyes are fixed on another quarter of the earth. She already devours by anticipation the Turkish empire on this side the Bosphorus, and derides your humble supplications. The United Provinces of America are likely to augment the number of our enemies. Every European Power, either openly or secretly rejoices in the approaching downfall of a nation, which had attained to a point of elevation and prosperity before the present war, unprecedented in the annals of the modern world.

I may possibly be told by your friends, that you hold in your hands the infallible security for an honourable peace, by your acquisitions in the Mediterranean, in India, and beyond the Atlantic. But if we appreciate these boasted possessions, they shrink into little more than a name. Corsica is only held by the most precarious tenure, and is threatened with hourly attack from the very inhabitants who so lately submitted to the British crown. To
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suppose that it can continue to be retained by England, after the loss of Piedmont, of Genoa, and of Lombardy, is to abuse the credulity of the nation. It has followed in every age, and will ever follow, the fate of the neighbouring continent of Italy ; nor can we hope to remain masters of the island a single month after the English fleet ceases to block up the harbour of Toulon.

Are we then to look to India for the means of purchasing peace ? And is the restitution of the spoils of Holland to their former masters, to constitute the price of it ? Mr. Dundas, who doubtless so well knows the value of our recent conquests in the East, might have informed you, Sir, that far from essentially augmenting our strength and our resources, they tend, on the contrary, to exhaust and weaken us. Those wide-extended settlements have long been onerous and ruinous to their owners. While they were retained without a military force, or with only a few Sepoys and Malayes, to superintend the collections of spices, and other articles of commerce or revenue, they were, it is true, objects of rational policy to preserve. But, for many years, the Dutch have been oppressed beneath their weight. The capture of Cochin, Malacca, Negapatam, and the inferior facto-

ries upon the island of Ceylon, may serve to swell a Gazette, or to excite a momentary and delusive exultation in the populace: but, except to the captors, they will be productive of no real benefit. Even the entire conquest of Ceylon, and the acquisition or monopoly of the cinnamon trade, must be purchased at a price far beyond its value. Are you aware that it will require at least sixteen hundred troops to garrison Colombo, Point de Galle, and Trincomalee? Batavia will be the grave of the English; and its surrender to our arms ought to be deprecated, rather than desired. The Cape of Good Hope itself, which you are pleased to denominate and consider as the key of India, has been greatly over-rated. We begin, after the first violence of national joy at its capture has subsided, to appreciate its importance more accurately. Neither as a military station, nor as a granary, will it ever repay the enormous expences requisite for retaining it at a peace. Our dominions in the East are already far too extensive, and you cannot be ignorant of the alarming spirit of fermentation, or rather of discontent, which has recently manifested itself among the troops. You are only accelerating the destruction, and precipitating

pitating the downfall of the fabric, by loading us with the immense addition of the Dutch establishments in those remote seas.

Beyond the Atlantic we have in fact scarcely any thing to restore except Martinique. At Cape Nicola Mole, the English garrison is blockaded and besieged. The other settlements on St. Domingo have been already abandoned, or can only be kept at a prodigious annual expenditure of men and money. It would, indeed, have been fortunate for us if we had never landed on that devoted shore, where whole regiments have fallen victims to the malignancy of the climate. If we look to the West-India islands, what more have we there to concede, except Tobago? Victor Hugues, at the head of a disciplined and ferocious army, composed of negroes, renegadoes, and buccaneers, is much too formidable to be attacked with any prospect of success in Guadaloupe. The efforts of Sir Ralph Abercrombie must be directed rather to preservation than to conquest, and will probably be limited to the recapture of St. Lucie. Grenada and St. Vincent's, laid waste and destroyed, may long remain, for the most part, an unproductive wilderness, even after the ejection of foreign enemies.

But, let us suppose for a moment, that we were completely masters of both the Indies, and that we held them by the most permanent tenure. Do you really believe, Sir, that, lucrative as such acquisitions might be to a trading nation, they would either facilitate or hasten the attainment of peace? They might, perhaps, have done so in other periods, when Fleury, or Choiseul, or Maurepas, conducted the councils of France. We then contended for empire, for territory, or for commerce. We are now at issue for our very existence as a people. If we were the sovereigns of all that Gama and Columbus discovered, or of all that Albuquerque and Cortez conquered in the two hemispheres, we should only become objects of greater envy, avidity, and plunder, to the enemy with whom we are engaged. It has been the fatal error and delusion of your ministry, to mistake wealth for strength, and to send expeditions to the extremity of Asia and America, instead of concentrating all your force at home. You are only decorating the victim with garlands for the knife. The fate of England will never be decided except *in* England. It is *here* that we must ultimately meet and vanquish the enemy, or submit to the same humiliating

humiliating conditions which they have already imposed on other nations and princes. It is upon the Rhine and the Po, that the destruction of Great Britain will be signed and stipulated.

Are you prepared to meet and repel the shock of that invasion which inevitably impends? The termination of war between France and the Emperor will be the signal for undertaking it. Already many hundred boats and vessels of every species and dimension are secretly collecting, or constructing in the innumerable creeks of Holland, from Goree and Helvoetfluys, to the entrance of the Schelde. A few days will transport the hardy and veteran legions of Pichegru and of Jourdan, from Dusseldorf or Cologne, to Rotterdam, to Dunkirk, and to Antwerp. The Eastern coast of this kingdom is incapable of being protected against an enterprising enemy, by any naval force, however numerous, vigilant, or active. Had Philip the Second been master of the ports of Holland, his armada would have met with a different fate. Such has been the systematical determination of the French government, at all events, to try the experiment, that they have recently employed a skilful engineer to sound the whole shore of England, and to ascertain the various

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ous depths of water, from the mouth of the Humber, round to that of the Thames. Though the person selected for the commission did not succeed in the whole object entrusted to him, his Majesty's Ministers have, doubtless, not forgotten the facts which appeared on his seizure and examination. I forbear to say more upon a point which is too delicate for discussion, and which cannot be considered without affording matter of the deepest and most awful reflection.

How, then, it may be demanded, can we escape from the toils that surround us? How sooth, or chain a desperate adversary, insolent from success, incapable of listening to considerations of ordinary policy, and inflamed at once with the desire of plunder, vengeance, and victory? By what political charm can we hope to mollify or disarm a people, accustomed to blood, steeped in poverty to the lips, inured to every species of renunciation, and who, after having humbled or vanquished all their other opponents, prepare, even-handed, to close with their only surviving foe? The situation, I confess, is such, as demands no common wisdom, and no ordinary measures. It is not by the little arts of a vulgar and insidious policy, or by
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any indirect and diplomatic propositions veiled in studied ambiguity, that we can hope to check or to divert the torrent. We have seen in the recent rejection of Mr. Wickham's overtures to the French Minister at Basle, how deaf an ear the Executive Directory turns to any attempt of that nature.

If we really hope or desire to obtain terms *from* the French people, such as Great Britain can with honour accept, we must address ourselves *to* the French people. It may be done, Sir, without violating the majesty of the Throne, or compromising the dignity of the Legislature. Lay aside the miserable forms in which you have been hitherto entrenched. Call together the new Parliament without delay. Speak to them in the language that befits the time and the magnitude of the emergency. Conceal from them nothing which it imports us to know. Throw yourself upon their candour to pardon your past errors, and shew that you can yet be worthy of their future confidence. Issue a declaration on the part of the King, sanctioned by both branches of the Legislature. Address it not only to the English people, but, in effect, to every European nation, and to mankind.

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Explain clearly what you demand, and what you are ready to concede, for peace. Prove to the world that neither ambition, nor rapacity, nor the vain and impracticable hope of dismembering France, are your motives for continuing the war. Disclaim all connexion with the Count de Provence, and any support of his title, or his right to the Throne. Renounce in unambiguous terms, every idea of intermeddling with the French government! Above all, declare that the protection which you may henceforward extend to any individuals of the Bourbon family, is only given as to expatriated and suffering exiles, not as to princes claiming the crown by hereditary descent. Call upon the inhabitants of France themselves to aid you in restoring tranquillity to Europe! But, when you invoke their assistance, omit the insulting or opprobrious epithets with which you are accustomed too freely to load them, in the House of Commons. Such impotent abuse may irritate, but cannot wound. Adjure them by that liberty which they profess to venerate, to stop the further effusion of human blood; and even, if necessary, to check the violence of the Executive Directory, and to controul their vengeance or ambition. This, Sir, is the
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only measure which can be efficacious; and which, if it failed of producing the desired effect abroad, must nevertheless be followed by advantages of a thousand kinds at home. It would close the domestic wounds and breaches of this country. It would awaken loyalty, and extinguish sedition. It would silence opposition in Parliament, and it would revive every sentiment of patriotism without doors. It would convince Europe that we do not desire, as is invidiously asserted, to monopolize the commerce of both the Indies. Even your enemies would do justice to the magnanimity of such a conduct, and own that you was not totally undeserving of the station you occupy.

I am, however, far from flattering myself that you are capable of approving or of following advice so enlarged and salutary. It is not among men who, like you, have been habituated from their first entrance on manhood, to absolute authority, that truth finds an easy access, or a favourable reception. The contractors and parasites who surround you, are too much interested in prolonging your delusion, to suffer you to profit by experience, or ever to permit you to avow your errors. In every convulsion of the French capital, in every conspiracy of

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the anarchists, in every depreciation of the mandates, they see the immediate fall of the Republic. Even now they tell you that the government is on the brink of destruction, and Paris ready to become the prey of flames, or to be abandoned to pillage. They forget that while Marius and Sylla filled the imperial city with massacre and proscription, the Roman legions overran the earth.

In the two Houses of Parliament you behold only a prostrate assembly, attentive to your nod, fascinated by your eloquence, and anticipating your wishes. Unfortunately for this country, so diminished is the Opposition in numbers, and so fallen in the public estimation, as to liberate you even from the decent forms of parliamentary respect and discussion. You are not fettered, like your predecessor Lord North, or compelled to undergo the perpetual slavery of diurnal and nocturnal attendance in the House of Commons. Your slumbers are not broken, nor are your convivial hours disturbed by debates and divisions. Scarcely is the dull uniformity of the session diversified or chequered by a single evening of exertion. The Parliament, which is about to assemble, will, unquestionably, not be less submissive, or less partial

partial to your virtues, than was the last. Mr. Rose will administer the state during the interregnum, preside over the elections, and smooth every asperity that can interrupt your future repose.

In the fatal facility with which you negotiate loans, and borrow millions on the shortest notice, I am too sensible that you have discovered the infallible secret of perpetuating and cementing your authority. In the scandalous and careless inattention of the late House of Commons, to superintend, or even to inquire into the expenditure of the sums thus raised, we trace the indelible symptom of a degenerate age. We are lost in amazement and indignation at contemplating the treasures already lavished since the commencement of the present war : we dare not even speculate upon the still greater demands, which its continuance will render necessary. The extravagance, attributed by his enemies to Lord North, was parsimony, compared with the profusion of the present moment. How is it, Sir, that in the midst of the enormous grants made since last November, and after two loans, unprecedented in magnitude, of full five-and-twenty millions, the most disgraceful poverty is visible in every

department? I blush for the dignity, while I feel for the humiliation, of your royal Master. Are you aware of the state to which you have reduced him? Or do you desire, after bringing your country to the edge of insolvency, to render the Sovereign a public bankrupt? Is it decent to allow the civil list to be near six quarters in arrear, and to suffer the immediate servants of the King's household to perish with hunger, while more than a hundred thousand pounds are annually lavished on foreigners, and on emigrants? Take care, Sir, how you abuse the patience of a people, slow to complain, but whose resentment will be necessarily proportioned to the outrages they suffer.

Your panegyrists will perhaps remind us of the period of the American war, and attempt to derive a species of consolation, allied to triumph, from the comparison between the present time, and that melancholy era. But do you presume, Sir, to put your political embarrassments in competition with those of Lord North? He was compelled to combat a people neither less ardent, nor less pertinacious in defending their liberties, than are the French of this day. He was obliged to carry on hostilities across the Atlantic, at the distance of a
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thousand leagues. When already wearied, and sinking under that conflict, he was necessitated successively to engage the whole force of France, Spain, and Holland, sustained by the armed neutrality of the Baltic powers. You, on the contrary, have been placed at the head of the greatest confederacy which Europe ever witnessed, and you have had only a single enemy to oppose. Be assured, Sir, whatever your flatterers persuade you, that your talents are not calculated for the tempest! As a Minister of Finance, or as a Chancellor of the Exchequer, you may deserve a conspicuous place in history, and even merit highly of your country; but we can neither be saved by eloquence, nor extricated by oratory. Great only in the House of Commons, you shrink into less than human proportions, from the instant that you pass the threshold of the Lobby. We look for the sublime endowments that distinguished the late Earl of Chatham, and we find only his tones and his name.

I have hitherto attacked you as a public functionary. Let me now, before we part, address a few words to you in your private and individual capacity. If under this relation I permit myself to compare you with every Minister

nister who has presided in the councils of England since the abdication of James the Second, you stand, it must be confessed, altogether alone. The Godolphins, the Walpoles, and the Pelhams, were closely and integrally united with the Prince whom they served, and the people whom they governed. They had a great hereditary stake in the country. They felt the warmest and dearest interest in its preservation, its felicity, and its prosperity. They were not merely animated to perform their duty by ambition, by the love of glory, or the thirst of fame, however laudable may be those emotions, and however inseparable from pre-eminent parts. When they retired from the presence of the Sovereign, or from the tumult of a popular assembly, they were necessarily met by the pledges of domestic love. Their eye must have been sometimes brightened by hope, and sometimes dimmed by conjugal or parental solicitude, when they directed their view forward to a dark futurity, or contemplated the awful and possible revolutions of states and empires.

You, Sir, are happily a stranger to these delicious, but painful sensations. You may coolly indulge in reveries upon the moral or
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political convulsions with which Europe is menaced at the present moment. You may, without disturbing the serenity of your mind, or the equanimity of your temper, steadily survey even the possible fall of the British Constitution; the sublimest effort of political wisdom, and the greatest work of civilized man. Destitute alike of patrimony and of descendants, your cares are necessarily limited to the preservation of your office, and the support of your personal glory: nor, if unfortunate, can you desire any other grave than the ruins of the monarchy, under which you seem determined to bury yourself. Incapable of descending into a private station, after having so long occupied the highest place; unsoftened by the daily intercourse of tender and domestic offices; insulated in the midst of society, you are too intractable to profit by experience, and too haughty to listen to admonition.

Hopeless, however, as I am, that my exertions will be effectual or beneficial, I shall, at least, derive a feeble consolation from having, like Laocoon, deprecated and foretold the calamity, which I cannot avert. The present Opposition is too inconsiderable to impose any
obstacle

obstacle or impediment to your measures. It is only the Nation, collected in the persons of its Representatives, which, if roused to a sense of the danger, can dictate to you imperiously its pleasure. The Parliament which is about to be convened in July, will have, I trust, this task to execute. Never did any legislative assembly meet to deliberate on interests so deep, or to discuss questions so vast and momentous. The Convention of 1688 only gave away the Crown. The Parliament of 1796 will have to decide whether we shall remain a Monarchy, and a People. On their resolves it must depend, whether we are blindly to abandon to you the direction of a war which you have shewn yourself incapable of conducting, ruinous from its expence, impracticable in its objects, and doubtful, if not destructive, in its issue: Or whether, by forcing you to adopt measures at once dignified, conciliating, and pacific, we shall more effectually compel France to suspend her revolutionary fury, and to restore to Europe the blessings of universal peace.

F I N I S.

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